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The Spratly Islands lie in the South China Sea, occupying a 150,000
square mile area between Malaysia and Brunei to the south, Vietnam to
the west, the Philippines to the east, the People's Republic of China to
the northeast, and Taiwan far to the north. The chain consists of
numerous islands, islets, reefs and coral atolls.' Those pieces of dry
land that can be classified legally as islands' are tiny, nothing more than
guano and scrub-covered coral atolls that have risen marginally above sea
level. The largest island in the chain, Itu Aba,3 is only 0.4 square
kilometers in area.4 The Spratlys have been variously described by
journalists as "a group of tiny islands,"5 "a motley collection of atolls
[and] coral reefs," 6 and "flyspecks of land in the South China Sea. "' The
* University of Maine School of Law, Class of 1996.
1. Estimates of the number of features (including dry-land islands, semi-
submerged reefs, submerged reefs, and atolls) making up the Spratlys vary widely, if not
wildly, from 60 to more than 500.
2. Article 121 (1) of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
defines an island as "a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is
above water at high tide." See infra note 13, at 1291.
3. Taiwan, which occupies this island, calls it Taiping Island. Michael Bennett,
The People's Republic of China and the Use of International Law in the Spratly Island
Dispute, 28 STAN. 1. INT'L L. 425, 429-430 (1992).
4. Id.
5. Julian Brutus, Prospects of Oil Make Spratlys Hot Property: Storm Brews
Around the Islands, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, July 26, 1994, at 7.
6. Robert Thomson, Lure of the Spratlys' Empty Atolls, FIN. TIMEs, Mar. 23,
1988, at 3.
7. Ben Tierney, Bullets May Eventually Fly over Some Flyspecks of Land in the
South China Sea, OTTAWA CITIzEN, Aug. 16, 1992, at B5.
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island group also has been given several proper names: the Nansha
Islands (China), the Truong Sa archipelago (Vietnam), Kalayaan or
"Freedomland" (the Philippines) and, of course, the Spratlys.
Until the second half of this century, the Spratlys were almost
entirely ignored by the world community. The only resources the islands
offered were small guano and phosphate deposits, seashells, turtle meat,
and fish. These resources were enough to attract only occasional
exploitation by adventurous fisherman and phosphate miners. The tiny
size, remoteness, and vulnerability of the islands to tropical storms made
them unattractive to permanent settlement, and the island group was
perhaps best known by mariners, who were careful to avoid the countless
reefs and shoals in the region marked as "dangerous ground" on their
charts.9
The area remained largely unnoticed by the world until the early
1970's, when an Asian oil boom-and record-high world oil prices-
stimulated an increase in oil exploration in the South China Sea. Major
oil fields were discovered off the coasts of Malaysia and Brunei, just to
the south of the Spratlys. In 1973, Russian seismologists explored and
found signs of oil fields off the coast of North Vietnam, to the west of
the Spratlys.' 0  That same year, the Philippines embarked on an
ambitious campaign of oil exploration off the island of Palawan, which
lies immediately to the east of the Spratlys. With major oil strikes
virtually surrounding the Spratlys, it was no wonder that the attention of
a number of Southeast Asian nations ultimately turned to these tiny
islands." Today, it is acknowledged by the international oil industry that
the Spratlys may lie atop an "elephant" of petroleum, with potential to
yield in excess of a billion barrels of oil and untold quantities of natural
gas.' 2 On this basis alone, these forgotten islands have become the most
sought-after property in Asia.
8. Choon-Ho Park, Maritime Claims in the China Seas: Current State Practices,
18 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 445, 453 (1981).
9. Clayton Jones, Law of the Sea Runs Aground Amid 26 Tiny Coral Isles,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, June 10, 1983, at B6.
10. Hungdah Chiu & Choon-Ho Park, Legal Status of the Paracel and Spratly
Islands, 3 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L.J. 1, 4 (1975).
11. Id.
12. Wilson da Silva, Western Companies Seek Oil Finds to Rival Middle East,
Reuter Business Report, Aug. 26, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, REUBUS
File.
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The recently ratified 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Conven-
tion (hereinafter LOS) 3 codifies the "bundle of rights" that accrue to a
state which has territorial sovereignty over an island or a group of
islands. Most important among these rights is the exclusive right to
exploit the resources of the sea bed surrounding an island or archipelago.
The state holding territorial sovereignty over an island is allowed, under
the LOS, to establish a 12-mile territorial sea and a 200 mile Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) around the island. 4 If the state has territorial
sovereignty over an entire archipelago, it has the right to draw a straight
baseline between the outermost islands and will have exclusive rights to'
exploit the resources of the sea bed within the area enclosed by that
baseline. 5 To the claimants vying for the Spratlys, the implications of
territorial sovereignty over the islands under the LOS are all too clear.
In addition to its potential resources, the Spratlys archipelago
occupies a strategic location. Lying between the coast of Vietnam on the
west and the Philippines to the east, the Spratlys occupy a potential
blocking position for ships transiting the South China Sea. Aircraft
based in the Spratlys would be within range of the Malacca and Sunda
Straits, bottlenecks through which shipping in the South China Sea must
pass in order to enter the Indian Ocean. A military presence, such as an
airfield located in the Spratlys, could effectively halt all shipping in the
South China Sea in the event of a conflict. This is a fact of no small
consequence to nations in the region, who are currently restructuring
military relationships in the wake of the end of the Cold War.
Today, six Asian nations-the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei,
Vietnam, Taiwan and the People's Republic of China-vigorously assert
claims of sovereignty over all or parts of the Spratlys. 6 Based on these
assertions, journalists are using new and more ominous phrases to
describe the Spratlys: "the eye of a political typhoon" and "a potential
Falklands. "'"
With so much at stake, the claimants to the Spratlys have pursued
the sovereignty issue in various ways. All except Brunei have taken
steps to physically occupy numbers of islands, including landing garrison
13. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec.
10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/122, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) [hereinafter LOS].
14. LOS, supra note 13, arts. 3-4, 46, 47, 57; at 1272, 1278, 1280.
15. LOS, supra note 13, arts. 47, 56-57; at 1278, 1280.
16. Lee G. Cordner, The Spratly Islands Dispute and the Law of the Sea, 25
OcEAN DEV. & INT'L L.J. 61, 62 (1994).
17. Jones, supra note 9.
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troops, erecting stone "sovereignty markers," and building lighthouses
and weather stations. This is the practical approach to acquiring
sovereignty, applying the simple theory that "possession is nine-tenths of
the law." 8 The effort to occupy the islands is also an element of a legal
approach to establishing sovereignty, as will be explained in detail in
Section III of this article. Some of the claimants have backed their
occupations with naval patrols, in an attempt to consolidate their own
holdings and to prevent others from expanding occupation to remaining
islands.'9 One nation, Malaysia, has even taken the unique step of
establishing a small resort on a disputed island.' While taking these
practical measures, all of the claimant nations have been careful to craft
legal claims to the Spratlys, both to justify their current occupation of the
islands and to prepare for any negotiation or arbitration proceedings that
may be necessary to settle the dispute.
The prospect of negotiating a settlement is being treated gingerly by
the disputants, as the militarily more powerful nations-China and
Vietnam-each carefully avoid the subject of multilateral negotiations on
the issue of sovereignty, while trying to entice and cajole weaker
disputants into bilateral talks on the issue.
This article will review and analyze the various legal arguments
advanced by the six states currently claiming territorial sovereignty in the
Spratlys. This will begin in Part II with a review of the history of the
dispute, and will be followed by a discussion of the primary legal
theories under which the disparate claimants might assert claim to
territorial sovereignty over remote islands in Part III. Part IV will then
explore the alternative methods-legal and practical-that these states
may use in order to finally settle the dispute over the islands. In Part V,
some conclusions will be drawn concerning the merits of these methods.
18. Julian Brutus, Experts Say China's Claim is Flawed and Vietnam has more
Valid Claim to Resources in Spratlys Area, SOUTH CHINA MORING POST, May 13,
1994, at 6, available in LEXIS, News Library, SCHINA File.
19. Phillip Melchior, Vietnam Calls for Spratlys Talks as Tension Builds Up,
REUTERS LIBR. REP., May 31, 1988, available in LEXIS, News Library, REUWLD
File.
20. Charles P. Wallace, Who Wants the Spratlys? Just About Everyone, L.A.
TIMEs, July 16, 1991 at 8, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File.
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE SPRATLYS DIsPuTE
Four out of the six claimants to the Spratlys base their legal
arguments for sovereignty upon some historical connection with the
archipelago, with contacts either dating back to antiquity or of more
recent origin. Although Vietnam, the People's Republic of China (PRC),
and the Republic of China (Taiwan) all claim historic ties to the Spratlys
reaching back hundreds of years, the history of the Spratly Islands as a
disputed land mass begins in the nineteenth century and comes into
sharpest focus during the twentieth century. During this period,
European and Asian nations began to realize the potential strategic value
of these islands-and began to quarrel over them.
One of the earliest treaties used by a nation to assert a claim over the
Spratlys is the Convention Respecting the Delimitation of the Frontier
Between China and Tonkin (Vietnam), signed by China and France in
1887. Under this treaty, France and China agreed to a French
protectorate over what today is Vietnam. In addition, the treaty
established a French claim to areas in the South China Sea lying west of
a line 1050 43' east of Paris. The Spratlys lie east of this line, and
therefore beyond the French claim. Today, China uses this treaty as part
of its argument for Chinese sovereignty over the Spratlys.' It is
interesting to note, however, that while China may base part of its claim
to the Spratlys on this 1887 treaty, China waited more than a century
(until 1988) to actually occupy any of the islands.
The actual dispute over ownership of the Spratlys began 46 years
after the signing of the treaty, when France announced it had occupied
a number of islands in the South China Sea, including a number of the
Spratlys. China was quick to react to the occupation and lodged
diplomatic protests in both 1933 and 1934. These protests were based
on China's claim to "historic ties" to the islands and on the provisions
of the 1887 treaty.' However, the Chinese government carried the
dispute no further, as it was at this time becoming embroiled in a much
larger and catastrophic dispute with Japan, the Asian beginnings of what
would become the Second World War.
With the war came Japanese invasions of areas throughout the
region, and the Spratlys were not immune. The French presence
21. Chiu & Park, supra note 10, at 11.
22. Id.
23. Cordner, supra note 16, at 64.
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disappeared under Japanese military invasion in 1939. The Japanese
renamed the Spratlys the "Shinnan Gunto" archipelago. Japan used one
of the hidden resources of the Spratlys, their strategic location, to great
advantage during the war. Japanese soldiers occupied the islands, and
naval bases were established from which Japan's navy could assist in
invasions and effectively block Allied shipping.' This was the most
significant occupation of the islands since their discovery, but like
previous occupations of the Spratlys, it was not to last.
The Japanese withdrew from the Spratlys at the conclusion of the
war in 1945. The islands were then unoccupied until 1946, when the
Republic of China (still under the Guomintang government of Chiang
Kai-shek) sent a small naval contingent and a garrison force to occupy
an island known as Itu Aba. The Guomintang government put this island
under administrative jurisdiction of Kuangtung Province, a part of
mainland China. These actions took place against the backdrop of the
Chinese Civil War, which the Guomintang ultimately lost. In mid-1950,
forces of the new People's Republic of China (PRC) took Hainan Island.
The Guomintang government concluded that it was only a matter of time
before the PRC swept them out of the Spratlys, and made the decision
to abandon Itu Aba. The predicted invasion never occurred, and by
1951 all of the Spratlys were unoccupied.'
The San Francisco Allied-Japanese Peace Conference of 1951 was
convened to sort out many of the territorial issues that remained in
Southeast Asia in the wake of World War II. In particular, it was a way
for the Allies to compel Japan to formally relinquish territorial claims it
had staked throughout the Pacific before and during the war. Among
these claims was a claim to the Spratlys. As a result of agreement at the
San Francisco Conference, Japan formally renounced its claim to the
Spratlys. 2
Of the other nations that might have used this opportunity to make
ownership claims in the Spratlys, it is surprising that France, a
participant in the Conference, did not reassert its claim at this time.'
Vietnam, on the other hand, asserted a territorial claim based on
24. Teresa Poole, Spratly Islands under Shadow of Expansionism, THE INDEPEND-
ENT, Feb. 13, 1992, at 14.
25. Cordner, supra note 16, at 64.
26. Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, art. 2(f), 3 U.S.T. 3169, 136
U.N.T.S. 45.
27. Bennett, The People's Republic of China and the Use of International Law in
the Spratly Islands Dispute, supra note 3, at 432.
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France's prior interests. This claim, which was not contested by any of
the participants,' was the beginning of Vietnam's active involvement in
the dispute. Neither the PRC nor Taiwan participated in this Confer-
ence.
The Spratlys remained unoccupied for another period of five years,
until Taiwan returned in 1956 to reoccupy Itu Aba. Taiwan has been
occupying this island ever since, and regularly sends naval patrols
through the area to assert its sovereignty.' Taiwan's occupation of Itu
Aba is the longest continuous occupation of any of the Spratlys since the
dispute over the islands began.,
Also in 1956, in one of the more novel approaches to claiming the
Spratlys, a Filipino lawyer and businessman, Tomas Cloma, claimed a
number of islands in the chain (by right of his discovering them in 1947)
and attempted to create a new state, "Kalayaan" or "Freedomland" on the
islands.' His establishment of settlements on these islands raised
diplomatic eyebrows and stimulated official protests. In the end, the
settlers thought better of living on these remote islands and the settle-
ments disappeared. Nevertheless, the Philippines bases its claim to these
islands on the original Cloma claim.
One of the nations protesting the Cloma claim was Vietnam, which
based its own claim to the Spratlys upon succession to the pre-war
French claims. As noted above, Vietnam made its own official claim of
sovereignty over the islands, uncontested and virtually unnoticed, at the
San Francisco Conference of 195 ." In 1956, in response to the Cloma
claim, the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) reiterated its claim of
sovereignty over the Spratlys and placed the chain under provincial
administration.32 Notably, the North Vietnamese government contested
the Republic's claim, supporting instead China's claims to sovereignty
over the islands.33 In any case, the Vietnamese made no move to occupy
any of the islands for another 15 years.
28. The PRC protested any prospective claim to the Spratlys in advance of the
Conference.
29. Richard D. Fisher, Jr., Brewing Conflict in the South China Sea, HERITAGE
FouND. REP., Oct. 25, 1984, at 3.
30. Mark Fineman, Fiipinos Guard Isles; Nations We for Specks in the South
China Sea, L.A. TIMEs, Mar. 16, 1987, at 1.
31. Chiu & Park, supra note 10, at 14.
32. Id. at 9.
33. Cordner, supra note 16, at 66.
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In 1958, the People's Republic of China issued a declaration on
China's territorial sea, under which the government proclaimed a 12
nautical mile territorial sea and explicitly stated that this limit applied to
the Nansha (Spratly) Islands. 4 Despite this sweeping claim of sover-
eignty, the PRC made no move to physically occupy any part of the
Spratlys for the next 30 years.
With the 1960's came the Vietnam War, and the issue of the remote
Spratlys virtually disappeared. Various claims to the Spratlys remained
latent and no country moved to occupy more of the islands until 1968,
when the Philippines occupied three islands.35 This went almost entirely
unnoticed against the worldwide tumult of 1968.
In 1973, with the Vietnam War approaching its end, South Vietnam
reasserted its claim to the Spratlys, and occupied five of the islands
thereafter. 36 This action prompted a strong protest and warning from the
People's Republic of China, but the latter country, despite its rhetoric,
took no action to eject the Vietnamese.3 South Vietnam occupied these
islands until 1975, when the Hanoi government took control of Vietnam.
In 1974, Tomas Cloma formally relinquished his claim to the
Kalayaan Island group to the Philippine government of Ferdinand
Marcos. President Marcos in turn decreed in 1978 that this island group
(a subset of the Spratlys archipelago) was annexed to Palawan Province.
The Philippines eventually occupied eight islands in the Spratlys, all but
one of which was within the Kalayaan Group.3"
In 1978, Malaysia entered the fray by asserting a claim to three of
the southernmost Spratlys. In 1979, Malaysia issued a map of its
continental shelf, showing these islands as part of Malaysian territory.
In 1983, Malaysia established a military garrison on Layang Layang
Island (Swallow Island) to more clearly establish its claims, and followed
up with occupation of two other islands in 1986.11
The whole complexion of the Spratlys issue began to change
radically in the late 1980's. The Cold War, which once had exerted a
stabilizing influence in the region, collapsed. The Soviet Union,
34. Document on China's Claim to Xisha and Nansha Islands, BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, Feb. 1, 1980, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File.
35. Cordner, supra note 16, at 73.
36. Id. at 66.
37. Id. at 66.
38. Id. at 66-67.
39. Paul Lewis & Chris Donville, Asian Tensions Rise Over Oil Rights, DEF.
NEWS, Mar. 23, 1992, at 1.
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undergoing vast political changes, withdrew its military presence from
Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam. The United States, with some prompting by
the Philippine Senate-and the eruption of Mount Pinotubo-executed a
withdrawal from its major military presence at Clark Air Force Base and
Subic Bay Naval Base. The nearly simultaneous withdrawal of the two
largest Cold War powers left a political and military power vacuum in
the region. After U.S. and Soviet withdrawal from the region, by far the
strongest remaining power in Asia was the People's Republic of China.
China began to exercise this power in the Spratlys in 1988. During
that year, both China and Vietnam began campaigns to occupy the
remaining vacant islands of the Spratlys and the nearby Paracel Islands.
Early in the year, the PRC landed small contingents of troops on five of
the islands and on one large reef. Vietnam responded quickly by sending
its own troops to occupy 15 more of the islands. Finally, in March, a
Chinese naval patrol encountered and attacked three Vietnamese supply
ships on a resupply mission to the Spratlys. A number of these
freighters were sunk and several Vietnamese sailors were killed in the
encounter.40
This clash focused the attention of the international community on
the ongoing Spratlys dispute, but no action was taken to resolve the
controversy. After 1988, the PRC and Vietnam avoided further armed
conflicts, while both nations greatly stepped up their activities in the
area. In what could be fairly characterized as "the battle of the
lighthouses," both countries endeavored to stake out claims to various
islets by landing troops, taking photographs of them, laying down marker
stones4 and plaques, and erecting lighthouses. Each new occupation was
accompanied by public relations fanfare, reiterated claims of sovereignty
over the entire Spratlys chain, and counterclaims by the other side.
The tension over the Spratlys has been exacerbated in the 1990's by
a number of developments. The first is legislation passed by the PRC
which asserts ownership by China not of just the Spratly Islands, but the
entire South China Sea."' The second is a general military buildup by
40. David Holley, China, Hanoi Count Losses in Isles Clash, L.A. TIMEs, Mar.
17, 1988, at 6.
41. The Chinese were even reported to have loaded barges with stone markers and
dumped them into the sea atop shallow water reefs in an effort to claim sovereignty over
these features.
42. Xinhua News Agency, Law of the People's Republic of China in Its Territorial
Waters and their Contiguous Areas, Feb. 28, 1992, from BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File.
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the PRC in the South China Sea, including the establishment of a major
military airfield in the also-disputed Paracel Islands, which lie just to the
north of the Spratlys. From this base, the PRC will now be able to
project air power over the Spratlys (before building the base, the Spratlys
were out of range for Chinese warplanes based on Hainan Island, 900
miles distant). The third development is perhaps the most significant,
because it involves oil.
In June of 1992, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation
(CNOOC) signed an agreement with the Crestone Energy Corporation
of Denver, Colorado, by which CNOOC granted Crestone oil exploration
rights over an area encompassing 9500 square miles and abutting the
Spratlys. In signing the agreement, the Chinese publicly pledged to
Crestone that it would defend American exploration crews with its "full
military might." Crestone publicly estimated that the oil reserves lying
under the concession were in excess of one billion barrels.43 While much
of the area encompassed by the concession lies in or near the Spratlys,
its western extremities lie within 84 miles of the coast of Vietnam, well
within Vietnam's recognized 200 mile territorial limits.' The Crestone
Oil deal aggravated an already tense atmosphere surrounding the
dispute.45
With its strategic location and its potential oil wealth measurable in
billions of barrels, it is not surprising that several nations have
overlapping claims to the Spratlys chain. The recent military build up
in the area by the PRC, Vietnam, and other nations makes it equally
unsurprising that the Spratlys are considered one of Asia's potential flash
points. With all of these nations claiming the Spratlys, and some
demonstrating intent to defend their claims militarily, the question
remains: which nations have the strongest legal claims to the Spratlys and
how might these competing nations finally resolve their disputes over the
islands?
43. U.S. Firm Granted Oil Exploration Rights off Spratlys, STRArrS TIMES, June
20, 1992, at 3.
44. A.F.P., Vietnam Again Claims Violation of International Law by China-
Crestone, PLATT's OILGRAM NEWS, June 23, 1992, at 2.
45. The U.S. government went out of its way to warn Crestone that should trouble
develop between Vietnam and China over this concession, the company could not expect
American help.
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III. POSSIBLE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS FOR CLAIMS TO THE SPRATLYS
All six countries currently asserting claims to all or portions of the
Spratlys base their claims of territorial sovereignty on legal arguments.
As will be examined later, these legal arguments vary widely, and each
country advances its own geographic or historical evidence to prove its
claim. Before considering each of these claims, it is instructive to first
address the question: under what legal theories might a nation acquire
territorial sovereignty over remote islands under existing international
law?
A. Continuous and Peaceful Display of Sovereignty
In United States v. The Netherlands' (the Island of Palmas case), the
Permanent Court of Arbitration established legal standards by which a
nation might claim territorial sovereignty over an island. In this case,
the issue was "whether the Island of Palmas (or Miangas) in its entirety
forms a part of territory belonging to the United States of America or of
Netherlands territory."I Both nations had claimed sovereignty over this
isolated island (located, incidentally, not far from the Spratlys) and
supported their claims with differing legal arguments. The United States
claimed title based upon discovery by Spain and subsequent cession of
the island to the United States under the Treaty of Paris of 1898. The
Netherlands based its claim of title upon colonization of the island by the
Dutch East India Company as early as 1677, and on an uninterrupted and
peaceful exercise of the rights of sovereignty over the island since that
time.
The Permanent Court concluded that discovery alone was insufficient
to establish territorial sovereignty over an island. Discovery gives the
nation inchoate title to the territory, but in order to claim sovereignty,
this inchoate title "must be completed within a reasonable period by the
effective occupation of the region claimed to [have been] discovered."I
Absent this completion, "an inchoate title could not prevail over the
continuous and peaceful display of authority by another state. " 49
46. Island of Palmas Case (United States v. The Netherlands), 2 U.N. Rep. Int'l
Arb. Awards 829 (1928).
47. Id. at 832.
48. Id. at 846.
49. Id.
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Under the Island of Palmas decision, the nation claiming sovereignty
must prove a "continuous and peaceful display of state authority
[peaceful in relation to other states]."' Notably, the Court stressed that
the display of sovereignty must not be purely negative and exclusionary
in nature, that is, to the exclusion of the activities of other states within
the territory."1 The claiming nation cannot simply stake out a territory
and guard it as its own. Within the territory claimed, it must respect the
rights of other states.
The Court in the Palmas Case stated that the "display of territorial
sovereignty" must be "continuous," but recognized that in the case of
small, isolated islands the manifestations of territorial sovereignty may
reflect that isolation. There is no absolute requirement that the claiming
state exercise sovereignty "in fact at every moment on every point of a
territory."52 In the case of a far-flung island group or archipelago, this
type of control would be virtually impossible to maintain. Prob-
lematically for the Spratlys disputants, the Court in the Palmas Case did
not provide specific guidance on how long a period of occupation would
constitute continuous display of sovereignty. Nevertheless, the Island of
Palmas decision is regarded as one of the most comprehensive judicial
statements on what is required in order for a state to claim sovereignty
over an island. In the Spratlys dispute, Vietnam, Taiwan, and the PRC
all base their primary legal claims to sovereignty upon "continuous
exercise of sovereignty" over the islands-the Palmas standard.
B. Cession from a Predecessor State
It is a well settled principle of international law that a state which
has sovereignty over a particular area may cede sovereignty to another
state. 3 Provided that the successor state can prove that the predecessor
state actually had sovereignty, and that the predecessor ceded the
territory to the successor, the latter will have an indisputable claim by
right of cession. Vietnam bases its argument for sovereignty over the
Spratlys in part upon a claim that Vietnam is the successor to previous
French claims.
50. Id. at 868.
51. Id. at 839.
52. Id. at 840.
53. Cession, 1 Hackworth DIGEST § 61, at 421.
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C. Extension of Continental Shelf-Under 1982
Law of the Sea Convention
Malaysia and Brunei both base their claims to certain islands and
reefs in the Spratlys upon provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention
(LOS) of 1982. Basing claims of territorial sovereignty to land areas
upon provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention is legally question-
able, however. The LOS concerns itself primarily with the rights of
states to make use of the sea. It is concerned with such rights as
freedom of navigation, use and conservation of marine resources, and
resolution of disputes over usage of the sea and its resources.
The Articles of the LOS invoked by Malaysia and Brunei in making
their territorial claims are Articles 76 and 77. Article 76 describes in
detail what constitutes the "continental shelf' of a state.' Article 77 then
goes on to outline the sovereign rights of a state for the purpose of
exploring and exploiting the resources of its continental shelf.55 It is
crucial to note here that the definition of the continental shelf is
expressed entirely in terms of submarine terrain, and the resources that
are referred to as exploitable are submarine resources. Article 77(4),
which deals with rights to resources on the continental shelf describes
only "mineral and other non-living resources of the sea-bed. "56 Nowhere
in either of these Articles is there reference to how sovereign rights over
islands themselves is to be determined.
The LOS goes to some length to define exactly what constitutes an
island. Part VIII, Article 121(1) (the Regime of Islands) defines an
island as "a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which
is above water at high tide. "I The LOS sets out these objective criteria
because a state that has established sovereignty over an island has the
exclusive right, under Article 121(2), to exploit the resources of the
territorial sea, a contiguous zone and an exclusive economic zone (EEZ)
around an island "in accordance with the provisions of this Convention
applicable to other land territory. "5
In summary, the LOS concerns itself with defining the rights of a
state to exploit marine resources surrounding its land territory, but such
54. LOS, supra note 13, art. 76, at 1285.
55. LOS, supra note 13, art. 77, at 1285.
56. LOS, supra note 13, art. 77(4), at 1285.
57. LOS, supra note 13, art. 121(1), at 1291.
58. LOS, supra note 13, art. 121(2), at 1291.
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rights are predicated upon the state's territorial sovereignty over the land
mass, including islands. The LOS is a treaty about sovereignty over the
sea, not over land.59 It is left to the claimant state to prove first that it
has territorial sovereignty over the land before it can claim sovereignty
over the surrounding sea. Given that the LOS provides no mechanism
for determining sovereignty over land, the claimant state must rely on
other legal standards to support such a determination.
IV. EVALUATION OF RESPECTIVE CLAIMS TO TERRITORIAL
SOVEREIGNTY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. The People's Republic of China
The People's Republic of China claims territorial sovereignty over
the entire Spratlys chain. The PRC puts forward several legal bases for
this claim. Primarily, the PRC anchors its claim on its assertion of
longstanding historical contact with the islands. The PRC claims that
China both discovered and began to occupy the islands as early as 200
B.C.60
There is little doubt that the Chinese were the first to discover the
Spratlys. Chinese historians claim that records exist of Chinese activities
in the Spratlys as early 206 B.C. during the Han Dynasty, primarily the
voyages of fishermen.6" China was an active trading and seafaring nation
long before Europe exited the Middle Ages, and records show Chinese
mapping expeditions through the South China Sea that took place 200
years before Columbus sailed for America. Chinese scholars placed the
Spratlys on their maps of the region beginning in the early eighteenth
century.62
Although these records support the claim that China first discovered
the Spratlys, this would only serve to support a claim of inchoate title.
In order to perfect a claim of territorial sovereignty, according to the
Island of Palmas case, the state holding inchoate title must also maintain
a peaceful and continuous display of authority63 over the territory.
59. Tommy Koh & Robert Beckman, Law of the Sea Convention: Implications for
Singapore, STRAITS TIMES, Nov. 12, 1994, at 34.
60. Document on China's Claim to Xisha and Nansha Islands, supra note 34.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Island of Palmas Case, supra note 46, at 846.
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While the PRC asserts that the Chinese have maintained a continuous
presence in the chain since the fourteenth century, the records supporting
this claim are sparse and unconvincing. Mostly, the ancient records
show that groups of Chinese fishermen from Hainan Island camped
intermittently on some of the Spratlys. There is no credible record of
continuous occupation of the islands by the Chinese. While the PRC still
claims that the Spratly islands have been "effectively occupied" by
Chinese fishermen "since time immemorial," the claim to territorial
sovereignty is undermined by a 1928 Chinese government report that
delineated the borders of China. The borders included the Paracel (or
Xisha) Islands, but stopped short of including the Spratlys, which lie
immediately to the south.'
In addition to its claim of ancient historic contacts with the Spratlys,
the PRC invokes the comparatively modem 1887 bilateral treaty with
France, the Convention Respecting the Delimitation of the Frontier
Between China and Tonkin, in which France "ceded" territory lying east
of a line 1050 43' east of Paris, to China.' When France took the
initiative to occupy the Spratlys in 1933, China protested that this was
in violation of the 1887 Convention. France ignored the protests and
annexed the Spratlys to French Indochina. 6
The San Francisco Allied-Japanese Peace Conference of 1951 seems
to have clouded the issues surrounding claims to the Spratlys. The peace
treaty drafted by the United States and Great Britain for signature by the
Japanese contained a provision (Article 2(f)), which stated: "Japan
renounces all right, title, claim to the Spratly Islands and the Paracel
Islands."67 There was nothing in the treaty that suggested which country
would succeed to Japan's title. Vietnam, which had a delegate at the
Conference, stepped in quickly to lay claim to title. Neither Taiwan nor
the PRC had been invited to the Conference, so neither was able to
register a protest on the spot. However, PRC Foreign Minister Chou En
Lai, anticipating a disposition of the Spratlys issue at the Conference,
had issued a categorical statement of the PRC's position:
Whether or not the U.S.-British Draft Treaty contains provisions
on this subject and no matter how these provisions are worded,
64. Cordner, supra note 16, at 62.
65. Id. at 64.
66. Id. at 64-65.
67. Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra note 26.
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the inviolable sovereignty of the People's Republic of China
over Nanwei Island (the Spratly Islands) and Xisha Island (the
Paracel Islands) will not in any way be affected.'
It is clear from this statement that the PRC still claimed sovereignty
over the Spratlys. Yet the roots of the PRC's claim were still based
primarily upon discovery and intermittent occupation of some of the
islands by nomadic Chinese fishermen. The PRC made no move to
occupy any of the Spratly islands from its 1951 statement until 1988.
Any PRC administration of the Spratlys during the intervening decades
was limited to the periodic visits of enterprising Hainan fishermen.
In early 1988 the PRC took its first affirmative steps to occupy the
Spratlys, sending soldiers to occupy five of the islands. Not long after
the PRC arrived, its naval forces attacked and sank several Vietnamese
ships resupplying Vietnamese occupation forces in the area. Today, the
PRC occupies islands scattered throughout the Spratlys and continues to
base its claims of inviolable sovereignty upon historic contacts with the
islands.
Measured against the Island of Palmas standards, the Chinese claim
is not legally strong. First, discovery alone does not give the PRC title
to the Spratlys. There must be continuous and peaceful exercise of
sovereignty. Occasional, brief visits by Chinese fisherman could hardly
be considered to be the requisite exercise of sovereignty. Finally, it is
open to question whether China's relatively recent occupation of the
Spratlys would qualify as a continuous and peaceful exercise of
sovereignty. China's occupation of the Spratlys has been undertaken by
Chinese soldiers, and its exercise of sovereignty has been to the
accompaniment of Chinese naval gunfire. This is precisely the type of
negative exercise of sovereignty that the Palmas court excluded from
legitimacy.
B. Vietnam
Vietnam claims sovereignty over the entire Spratly archipelago and
advances two primary arguments to support its claim. First, the
Vietnamese government claims sovereignty on the basis of historical
exercise of control over the archipelago, a claim similar to that of the
68. Chiu & Park, supra note 10, at 14.
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PRC. Alternatively, Vietnam claims sovereignty by right of cession
from the French claim of sovereignty over the islands in the 1930s.
Like the PRC, Vietnam claims that it has "maintained actual
possession of, and continuously exercised its sovereignty over ... the
Truong Sa archipelago."6 9 In a statement issued by the central govern-
ment paper 'Nhan Dan' in 1988, the government presented a chronology
of Vietnamese control over the islands dating to the seventeenth century.
In the statement, the government indicates that "[u]p to the eighteenth
century" the Lords of Nguyen had established a team "in charge for the
exploitation and administration, as state power, of the Hoang Sa and
Truong Sa archipelagoes."7 The statement then lists a number of actions
that Vietnam took during the next 200 years to establish sovereignty over
the Hoang Sa archipelago-the Paracels, which lie to the north of, and
entirely separate from, the Spratlys.
The Vietnamese government presents no evidence to show that the
"team" set up by the Nguyens in the seventeenth century ever left
mainland Vietnam to administer and exploit the Spratlys. The statement
does not mention any further Vietnamese contact with the Spratlys until
1930, when a French ship, the La Malicieuse, under 'orders from the
French Governor-General of Indochina, sailed to the Spratlys and planted
the French flag and some stone markers on a number of islands.7 This
invokes the second Vietnamese argument, that of sovereignty through
succession to the French claim.
The 1930 visit of La Malicieuse to the Spratlys was brief. Having
planted their flags and stone markers, the French departed the area,
leaving the Spratlys unoccupied for three years. The French returned in
1933, announced occupation of a number of the Spratlys, and assigned
ownership of them to Ba Ria Province (French Indochina) under Decree
Number 4762-CP of December 21, 1933.2 France claimed the islands,
believing that they were terra nullius (land belonging to no one) before
1930. 3 Japan and China both disputed this claim and protested French
presence on the islands. Whether or not the islands were terra nullius
before French occupation was rendered moot by subsequent French
69. Vietnam Details Claim to ParacelandSpratly Islands, BBC Summary of World




73. Chiu & Park, supra note 10, at 18.
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inaction on the Spratlys sovereignty question following the Second World
War.
Japan conquered and occupied the Spratlys during the war and used
some of them as military bases. Immediately after the war, Japan left
the islands and the Spratlys were again unoccupied. France did not
return to reoccupy their lost territory or to reestablish a claim. On the
contrary, France, represented at the San Francisco Conference of 1951,
stood by while Japan officially relinquished title and all future claims to
the Spratlys. France did nothing at the Conference to reassert its own
claim to the Spratlys and France never again returned to the islands.
Vietnam quickly asserted its own claim at the Conference, basing such
claim upon succession to the French title to the islands.74 This theory is
problematic, because by not reasserting its own claim after the war, or
at the Conference, France had no title to which Vietnam could succeed.
Vietnam's failure to occupy the Spratlys after 1951 also weakens its
claim to succeeding the French. After stating at the San Francisco
Convention that the Spratlys "have always belonged [to] Vietnam,"75 the
Vietnamese government took no action to assert control over the islands
for five more years. This assertion of control in 1956 consisted of a
series of decrees, issued in response to the Cloma claim, by which the
Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) assigned the Spratlys to adminis-
tration under Phuoc Thy Province.76 Despite this series of official
decrees, the South Vietnamese government made no effort to occupy or
otherwise exercise sovereignty over the islands for almost two decades.
The Vietnamese claim dating to the 1950's suffers from yet another
flaw. At the time of the South Vietnamese claim, there were two
governments in Vietnam, the RVN government in South Vietnam and the
communist government in North Vietnam. At the time that South
Vietnam was asserting that the Spratlys had "always belonged to
Vietnam," the North Vietnamese government was supporting China's
claim to the islands. With the unification of Vietnam in 1975, the RVN
government ceased to exist, and the Hanoi government, the same
government that for decades backed the PRC claim to the Spratlys,
became the government of all Vietnam.' Upon taking control of
74. Cordner, supra note 16, at 65.
75. Vietnam Cites Historical 'International Legal'Recognition ofSRV Sovereignty
over Paracels and Spratlys, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Apr. 4, 1988.
76. Cordner, supra note 16, at 66.
77. Id.
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Vietnam, the communist government abruptly made an about-face on its
previous support for China's claim. Today's Hanoi government
unabashedly declares that the Spratlys "have always belonged to
Vietnam," but these declarations have a hollow ring in light of the Hanoi
government's past support for the PRC claim.
Vietnamese soldiers have been present on five islands in the Spratlys
since 1973, when South Vietnamese forces took the initiative to sail out
and occupy them. The Hanoi government took control of these five
islands after the war and in 1988 landed soldiers on fifteen more islands.
Vietnam's legal claim to the Spratlys suffers flaws that are similar
to those of the PRC claim. The claims of historic contact with the
islands are insufficient alone to establish territorial sovereignty,
especially when other countries like China and Taiwan can advance
equally credible claims of such contact. The Vietnamese occupation of
the islands has been essentially military in character, which brings into
question whether such exercise of sovereignty could be considered
peaceful in nature. Finally, the claim that Vietnam has sovereignty over
the Spratlys by way of succession to French sovereignty is undercut by
France's failure to reoccupy the islands after World War II, its failure to
reassert a claim at the San Francisco Conference in 1951, and by North
Vietnam's support of China's claim to sovereignty prior to unification of
Vietnam in 1975.
C. The Republic of China (Taiwan)
Taiwan's claims to the Spratlys are essentially the same as those of
the PRC, and are based upon long standing historical contact with the
islands. Consequently, Taiwan's argument suffers from the same
weaknesses as that of the PRC, namely, that discovery of and intermit-
tent contact with the islands are insufficient to establish claim to
territorial sovereignty. However, Taiwan has physically occupied and
exercised sovereignty over some parts of the Spratlys far longer than any
of the other more recent claimants, including the PRC.
Taiwan was the first state to establish a physical presence in the
Spratlys following the Japanese departure at end of the Second World
War. Taiwanese forces landed and occupied Itu Aba, the largest island
in the Spratlys in 1946. In 1947, Taiwan announced a territorial claim
to the Spratlys. In 1950, when communist Chinese forces took Hainan
Island, Taiwan withdrew from Itu Aba. Itu Aba remained unoccupied
for 5 years after this, and Taiwan returned to occupy Itu Aba again in
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1956. Since then, Taiwan has maintained a constant presence on Itu
Aba.
While Taiwan's claim to the entire Spratlys archipelago may not be
supportable for the reasons already stated, Taiwan has occupied Itu Aba
continuously and (relatively) peacefully for almost 40 years. This may
qualify, under the Palmas standards, as peaceful and continuous exercise
of sovereignty sufficient to give Taiwan a legally supportable claim to Itu
Aba.
D. The Philippines
The Philippines' claim to the Spratlys is based upon the "discovery"
of a number of the Spratlys by Thomas Cloma in 1947. In 1956, Cloma
proclaimed a new state, "Kelayaan" or "Freedomland," and named
himself chairman of the Supreme Council of Kelayaan State.78 The
Philippine government was bewildered by this development and neither
supported nor denied Cloma's claim. South Vietnam and China were
quick to dispute the Cloma claim.
"Kelayaan State" was limited to a brief occupation of a few islands
and the establishment of settlements. The settlers eventually abandoned
Kelayaan and retreated to Palawan, the nearest large island in the
Philippines. Nevertheless, Cloma continued to claim these islands until
the late 1970s.
The Philippine government's first official claim to the Spratlys was
purely reactive in nature. In 1971, a Philippine fishing vessel ventured
too close to Itu Aba Island, and was fired upon by forces of Taiwan,
which had occupied the island continuously since 1956. 79 In response,
the Philippine government protested and, among other things, claimed
legal title to the Spratlys based upon the Cloma "discovery." In 1974
Cloma officially transferred ownership of the Kelayaan group to the
Philippine government. In 1978 the Marcos government formally
annexed the group to the Philippines and placed it under administration
of nearby Palawan province.' Since then, the Philippines has occupied
eight of the islands.
The Philippines' claim, disputed from its beginnings, is perhaps the
weakest claim made by any of the disparate claimants to the Spratlys.
78. Id. See also Fineman, supra note 30, at 1.
79. Cordner, supra note 16, at 66.
80. Id. at 67.
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At the outset, Thomas Cloma's claim to have "discovered" the islands in
1947 is not credible. The Spratlys, including the islands claimed by
Cloma, had been subject to numerous mapping expeditions long before
that year, and had doubtless been "discovered" many times. Secondly,
the settlements established by Cloma remained for only about 90 days
before they were abandoned. Despite the fact that the Palmas case never
defined the term "continuous," it is unlikely that 90 days-followed by
abandonment-would fit the definition.
Nevertheless, the Philippines has occupied three islands since as
early as 1968 and has occupied five additional islands between 1980 and
1989. While the Philippines may not be able to claim the entire Spratlys
archipelago, it is still within reason that islands occupied peacefully by
the Philippines for a decade or more could be found to belong to the
country under the Palmas standard.
E. Malaysia
Malaysia claims only three islands in the Spratlys chain. The
Malaysian claim was established in 1979, and differs significantly from
the Chinese, Vietnamese and Philippines claims in that it relies upon
Article 76 of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. The islands claimed
by Malaysia all lie on a prolongation of Malaysia's continental shelf."1
Malaysia's claim to sovereignty over land, based upon the prolonga-
tion of the continental shelf of Malaysia is founded upon a misinterpreta-
tion of provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention of 1982. While
Malaysia may base claims to seabed resources upon Articles 76 and 77
of the LOS, these provisions do not legally support a claim to land areas
that are permanently above sea level.'
Notwithstanding its misinterpretation of the LOS, the Malaysian
claim to the three islands it occupies may prevail under international law,
but based upon an entirely different legal standard. In 1983, Malaysia
established a garrison on Layang Layang island, the largest of the three
islands it now claims. In 1986, Malaysia occupied two additional,
smaller islands. The islands claimed by Malaysia have never been
occupied by any of the other states claiming the Spratlys, and the
occupation by Malaysia has been peaceful and continuous since 1983.
81. Id. at 70.
82. LOS, supra note 13, arts. 76-77, at 1285.
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Thus, a claim of sovereignty over these islands might be supportable
under the standards of the Palmas case.
E Brunei
Brunei's only claim in the Spratlys is to Louisa Reef, which Brunei
claims lies upon an extension of its continental shelf. The reef is also
claimed by Malaysia, and the countries have been engaging in negotia-
tions since 1984 to resolve the two claims.
Like Malaysia's claim, Brunei's is based upon Articles 76 and 77 of
the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. However, Brunei's claim does not
suffer from the same misinterpretation of the LOS as the Malaysian
claim. Louisa Reef is a submarine feature, rather than an island. It has
no permanent dry land and is not habitable. It is essentially part of the
seabed. Thus, like any other part of the shallow seabed lying upon an
extension of a state's continental shelf, Brunei may exercise an exclusive
right to exploit the resources of the reef. Brunei must only prove that
the reef lies on an extension of its continental shelf.
V. ALTERNATIVES FOR RESOLVING THE SPRATLY DISPUTE
Article 2(3) of the Charter of the United Nations provides that "[a]ll
Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in
such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not
endangered." '  Article 33(1) of the Charter states that:
[t]he parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security,
shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry,
mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to
regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of
their own choice.'
The foregoing Articles contain well-meaning suggestions as to what
type of disputes should be settled and what means should be used to
settle them. Both provisions are broadly worded, however, and are
subject to varying interpretations, depending on the points of view-and
political motivations-of the disputants. While all six of the disputants
83. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(3).
84. U.N. CHARTER art. 33.
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in the Spratlys issue may generally agree that the issue should be settled
by negotiation, there is little or no agreement on who should be parties
to the negotiations. There is even less agreement about what to do if
negotiations do not settle the dispute.
For a number of reasons, the Spratlys dispute defies easy resolution.
These reasons range from the legal, to the political, to the cultural.
First, there is the problem of the multilateral nature of the dispute.
Today, six nations assert claims of territorial sovereignty in the Spratlys.
Some of the disputants (the PRC, Taiwan, and Vietnam) claim the entire
archipelago, while others (Malaysia and the Philippines) claim islands or
individual subgroups of islands. One claimant, Brunei, claims a
semi-submerged reef. Some of the disputants (the PRC and Taiwan)
have nearly identical legal arguments for sovereignty, based upon
historical claims. A number of the disputants (particularly Taiwan and
Vietnam) have occupied a few of the islands long enough to claim
territorial sovereignty under the Island of Palmas standard, but do not
have strong enough legal arguments to support their claims to the entire
archipelago.
Secondly, the bargaining power of the disputants varies widely. This
bargaining power derives, essentially, from military power and a
perceived willingness to apply it. While the PRC may not have the best
legal argument for sovereignty over the Spratlys, it has by far the
strongest military power of any of the claimants, and has already
demonstrated a willingness to use this power to back its agenda in the
region. In addition, the PRC has political and economic power that
eclipses its opponents. The Chinese national economy is booming, and
industrialized nations are flocking to China with visions of opening one
of the world's greatest untapped markets. This economic power
translates into political power. Western powers, focused on friendly
relations with such a large trading partner, would be unlikely to
intervene in any way if the PRC simply pushed all of its opponents out
of the Spratlys by force. The PRC government is keenly aware of its
own bargaining power and has adopted a unique (and coldly logical)
strategy to pursue the Spratlys issue.
Since its short, one-sided naval battle with Vietnam in 1988, the
PRC has repeatedly called for a peaceful, negotiated settlement of the
dispute. On a superficial level, these continuous calls for peaceful
negotiations make China appear to have entirely legal, and benign
intentions. At the same time, the PRC has consistently rejected, or
otherwise ignored, suggestions that multilateral negotiations be held on
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the Spratlys sovereignty issue. Rather, the government has pursued a
divide and conquer strategy, calling for bilateral negotiations between the
PRC and other individual disputants. The underlying premise of these
negotiations would be a willingness on the part of the PRC to share the
resources of the Spratlys with any state that is willing to recognize over-
all Chinese sovereignty. To this end, the PRC has made separate
overtures to the Philippines, Malaysia, and Vietnam to engage in bilateral
talks. Each of these states has so far declined to participate in
meaningful bilateral negotiations with the PRC.I
Another obstacle to settling the sovereignty issue is cultural in
nature. Simply put, it is a problem of "saving face." Vietnam, the
PRC, and Taiwan have all repeatedly made categorical claims of
sovereignty over the Spratlys. Vietnam and the PRC have been
particularly inflexible and vociferous about their claims. They have,
essentially, painted themselves into a comer. To compromise on these
claims now would entail a humiliating and unacceptable loss of face.
While the world might see some agreement in the future on joint
development in the Spratlys, it is highly unlikely that there will be an
agreement reached on the core issue of territorial sovereignty.
On a political and practical level, no solution to the Spratlys dispute
will be made permanent without the active participation of the PRC. The
near-superpower status of the PRC, coupled with its strong national
interest in the potential resources of the archipelago, ensures that any
solution that does not meet with Chinese approval will fail.
Progress on the Spratlys dispute will depend upon the willingness of
the various claimants to set aside the issue of sovereignty and explore
creative ways in which they might cooperate to share the potential wealth
of the Spratlys. China has recently taken a leading role in inviting joint
development, and it would be in the best interests of all involved in the
dispute to consider the invitation. As time goes on, opportunities for a
peaceful settlement of the dispute will diminish. Discovery of a major
oil field in the Spratlys by Vietnam or the Philippines (both of which are
85. The Foreign Ministers of Vietnam and China recently released a joint
communiqu6 announcing that the two countries were committed to resolve the Spratlys
dispute peacefully and would establish a committee to study maritime disputes between
the two countries, including the Spratlys issue. China suggested at this meeting that the
two countries embark on joint development of resources in the Spratlys even before
sovereignty issues are resolved. Vietnam demurred. Hiroaki Hayashida, China and
Vietnam Agree to Settle Territorial Row, The Daily Yomiuri, Nov. 23, 1994, available
in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File.
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actively exploring) will almost certainly prove an irresistible temptation
for China to settle the sovereignty issue by force of arms. Certainly,
Vietnam and the Philippines have no allies willing to fight a war with
China-and China requires no allies in order to win.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Spratlys dispute represents a very real threat to peace in
Southeast Asia, and an immense challenge-a Gordian .knot-for
international legal scholars. A few conclusions can be drawn from
analysis of the problem, however.
First, the conventional dispute settlement mechanisms of submission
to an arbitral panel, judicial solution, or submission to a regional agency
are inadequate to address an unconventional dispute as complicated as the
Spratlys. In this dispute there are too many variables. Some states claim
part and some claim all of the Spratlys. Some of the claimants have
peacefully occupied islands or groups of islands for varying lengths of
time. One of the most powerful disputants claimed the islands on legally
doubtful grounds and has occupied a large number of the islands by force
of arms. Some have advanced identical legal arguments based upon the
same sets of facts. It seems highly unlikely that a judicial or arbitral
body could place these variables in an order that would yield a solution.
Second, the potentially high stakes in this dispute make it unlikely
that any of the claimants (except those who are virtually powerless
otherwise) will seek to submit it to an independent judicial or arbitral
body. All of the disputants would rather pit their negotiating skills
against one another than surrender the decision making in this dispute to
an outside panel. Given the purely intra-Asian nature of the dispute it
is highly unlikely that the parties would find comfort in submitting the
dispute to a court or arbitral panel consisting of Americans, Europeans
or other non-Asians.
Finally, the disputants seem today to be working toward the best
means available for resolving any major dispute: negotiation and
compromise. After all the stridency, posturing, threatening, and
jockeying for position, the Asian states involved in the Spratlys dispute
appear to be leaning in the direction of a negotiated solution of the
dispute, based upon China's recent proposal that the sovereignty issue be
laid aside and that resources in the Spratlys be shared by those who enter
into a negotiated agreement. It would be wise for the nations involved
to accept China's overtures, and to enter into serious negotiations on a
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resource-sharing arrangement soon, before a major oil strike changes
China's mind.
